Abstract
<p>This book addresses a critical question in insurgency studies: Why some rebel groups successfully become political parties, while others die trying. Only half of rebel groups with political aspirations manage to reinvent themselves as lasting political parties. The book argues that the key to successful rebel-to-party transformations lies in the organizational structures and institutions that rebels build during wartime. These proto-party structures, which involve governance, political messaging, social outreach, and other noncombat tasks, equip rebel groups with the personnel, skills, and routines needed to succeed in the electoral arena. The book draws on insights from organizational sociology to reconceptualize how rebel groups operate. Through examining the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front in El Salvador and other cases, it demonstrates that rebel groups with established proto-party structures often form the core of post-conflict parties and attract more votes. The book advances our understanding of rebel group dynamics both during and after conflict by showing that party-building begins not with the last bullet fired but with the very first.</p>