Abstract
<jats:p>The first 85 days of the U.S.–Iran conflict show a shift from coercive bargaining to procedural de-escalation. The United States moved from seeking strategic degradation of Iranian capabilities toward a narrower focus on suspending hostilities, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, managing the enriched uranium issue, and preserving an exit framework. Iran’s objectives also changed. Tehran expanded the bargaining package by linking any settlement to sanctions relief, oil-export access, sovereignty language, security guarantees, Hormuz arrangements, and retention or controlled handling of nuclear assets. This allowed Iran to convert survival under pressure into bargaining leverage. The reported Pakistan-mediated draft, if accurate, reinforces this shift. Its emphasis on ceasefire, mutual non-targeting, freedom of navigation, joint monitoring, talks on unresolved issues within seven days, and phased sanctions relief suggests a move toward ceasefire-first sequencing rather than final settlement. This brief argues that the conflict produced a dual bargaining structure: U.S. objective compression and Iranian leverage institutionalization. The negotiation became less about battlefield victory than about who could define the architecture of the post-conflict bargain.</jats:p>