Abstract
<jats:p>Evaluating the desirability of a reform typically involves weighing the gains of win- ners against the losses of losers using welfare weights, which measure the value that society places on a $1 increase in an individual’s consumption. These weights can capture various normative ideals such as utilitarianism and equality of opportunity. We develop a portable experimental method to elicit welfare weights and apply it to samples of the U.S. general population. We assess the robustness of the elicited weights to response quality and design features, validate them using measures of support for redistribution, and document their temporal stability. The aggregate welfare weights are progressive: under a constant-elasticity specification, the income elasticity of welfare weights lies between −0.85 and −0.71. These weights are roughly 8–9 times as progressive as the weights implied by the U.S. tax schedule and 4–5 times as progressive as those implied by U.S. tax and transfer policies.</jats:p>