Abstract
<jats:p>Elements of psychological warfare (PW) have recently been gradually implemented in the international arena, hence being a significant matter of interest for research. This article discusses the experience of PW waged in the framework of the military campaigns run by the USSR and the USA in Afghanistan. Both powers, by way of information and propaganda tools, sought to affect the moral and psychological state of the Afghans, and to make for somewhat a favorable perception of their presence among the local population. However, in both cases the outcomes were far from the anticipated. At the time of the introduction of a limited contingent of Soviet troops into the DRA, propaganda leaflets, radio broadcasts, films, and other propaganda means were actively employed, with a focus on projecting the image of the Soviet Union as the Afghan people’s ally and a defender of their interests. Nonetheless, said strategy failed since the cultural, religious, and social realities of the Afghan society were overlooked. After the coalition forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001, the US actively practiced psychological operations targeted at demoralizing Taliban and generating sympathies among the Afghan population. However, notwithstanding the massive efforts in the realm of the information influence, those operations failed to yield prolonged success due to the consequence that the Afghans’ civilizational and cultural, as well as psychological features were not reckoned with due measure. Hence, the PW employment in the framework of the Soviet and US military operations in Afghanistan demonstrates that in order to succeed in information operations the availability of resources and technologies does not go around. A profound knowledge of the enemy’s cultural, religious, and social characteristics is a must. Otherwise, even the best hi-tech and resource-intensive technologies might prove ineffective.</jats:p>