Abstract
<jats:p>This article discusses the legality of applying a preventive measure against the accused in cases where the necessity for such a measure is justified not by the behavior of the accused, but by the behavior of another person. Acknowledging that such an approach is unlawful and aiming to eliminate similar situations in practice, as well as to avoid unjustified restrictions on the rights of the accused, the article presents arguments that justify the inadmissibility of this approach. It is argued that the behavior of another person cannot be the basis for applying a preventive measure against the accused, as this contradicts both the principles and norms of the Criminal Procedure Code of the Republic of Armenia, the positions of the European Court of Human Rights, as well as the case law of the Court of Cassation of the Republic of Armenia, and the principles of legal certainty and proportionality enshrined in the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia. Agreeing with the position expressed by the Criminal Court of Appeal of the Republic of Armenia on this matter, and further developing this stance through comparative legal analysis, systematic interpretation, and other interpretative methods, the authors assert that the behavior of another person cannot, under any circumstances - whether directly or indirectly - serve as a valid justification for applying a preventive measure against the accused.</jats:p>