Abstract
<jats:p>The purpose of this article is to analyze the structure and effectiveness of civil control mechanisms over the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, with a focus on the roles of the President, Security Council, Government, and Federal Assembly. The article examines the institutional distribution of power, the limitations of budgetary control, and the operational autonomy of political bodies. It identifies core challenges to effective oversight, such as the high level of secrecy in defense matters, the limited authority of parliamentary committees, and the insufficient involvement of independent civilian expertise. The study outlines gaps in legislative regulation, institutional imbalances, and restricted public access to defense-related information. It proposes measures to strengthen civil oversight, including improving transparency in military budgeting, promoting cooperation with independent research institutions, and establishing a parliamentary ombudsman for armed forces affairs. The article underlines the urgent need to reinforce democratic accountability and legality in security governance in accordance with international norms.</jats:p>