Abstract
<jats:p>This article, based on a wide range of sources, some of which are being introduced into scientific discourse for the first time, attempts to provide a comprehensive analysis of the implementation of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “Murmansk initiatives”, studying their assessments and impact on the formation of a new type of the international cooperation in the Arctic in the short-term historical period from October 1987, when they were proclaimed, to 1990. The authors came to the following conclusions: it was no coincidence that Mikhail Gorbachev chose the Arctic as an arena for the implementation of the “new thinking” policy. The “Murmansk initiatives”, having become a regional reflection of the “new thinking” policy, were not perceived unambiguously in the West. The dividing line was drawn both in terms of the content of the initiatives themselves and the favorable perception of them by the Arctic countries. The authors positively assess the “non-military” component of the “Murmansk initiatives”. Despite the traditionally recognized failure of the component related to arms limitation, they nevertheless played a role in the development of the international relations in the region. At the same time, it is clear that during that period, the country’s leadership often acted to the detriment of national interests, making unilateral concessions in the name of reaching an agreement. The concept of neoclassical realism, which forms the basis of this study, explains this line of foreign policy behavior by the USSR as a complex combination of a number of factors: the inability to pursue the state’s previous foreign policy, which was characterized by an arms race in a bipolar world, the internal socio-economic crisis in the country, as well as the personal characteristics of Mikhail Gorbachev himself.</jats:p>