Abstract
<jats:p>This study offers an interdisciplinary analysis of two key foreign aid programs — the Marshall Plan and the Washington Consensus — through the prism of the evolution of the political and economic theories. The author documents significant differences in the assessments of these initiatives: while the Marshall Plan is viewed by experts as a predominantly successful example of long-term economic recovery and political stabilization of Western European countries after World War II, the Washington Consensus, implemented in the 1980s—1990s, is more often associated with negative shock effects and institutional failures in the developing countries. Such differences in assessments can be largely explained by the changing paradigms of foreign aid — from economic goals in the post-war period (GDP growth, production restoration) to complex tasks of institutional development and social equality at the end of the 20th century. The Marshall Plan, in line with the utilitarian criteria of its era, achieved its stated goals, while the Washington Consensus did not live up to expectations. Its failure resulted from a contradiction between its declared objectives (market reforms, openness to international trade, and the development of democracy) and its actual outcomes (rising poverty, the concentration of property, and economic and political crises). The study uncovers a cyclical pattern in the development of political and economic ideas — from the Keynesian model of active state intervention in the economy in the 1930s—1950s, to the neoliberal paradigm of the 1980s—1990s, and back to neo-Keynesian approaches following the crises of the early 21st century.</jats:p>