Abstract
<jats:p>In the philosophy of Kant, the theoretical principle of reason, as the ground of cognition of being, is opposed to the practical principle of reason, as the ground of realization of the valuable. In relation to the will of a being which is not necessarily determined by the objectively-valuable, a principle of practical reason presents itself as an imperative. The article discusses the significance of the opposition between theoretical and practical cognition for Kant’s theory of practical norms. If every practical imperative contains a notion of a good (objectively practically necessary) action anda practical rule for the determination of the will to act according to this notion, a logical and a practical synthesis of what is objectively valuable, this must be valid for problematic imperatives that present an action as a means for a possible scope of a will, as well as for assertoric norms that suggest the ways towards happiness as a scope which is immanent in all human beings by nature. Evaluating problematic imperatives Kant suggests that the judgement of practical cognition underlying them is analytical, but he loses sight of the genuinely practical or normative dimension of these principles. The assertoric-practical principles or recommendations of prudence, according to Kant, are based upon a notion of personal happiness, which is logically indefinite in an essential way, and therefore cannot aspire to the dignity of objectively practical commands and imperatives of reason. And yet remains the genuinely practical dimension of conditional norms in fact beyond the reach of this argument Kant’s, and accordingly of Kant’s critique of eudaimonistic ethics which makes an impression of uncompromising radicality. The real ground of incompleteness of the ethics of personal happiness is not the empirical nature of the elements of its principle but rather the insufficient general practical validity of that principle.</jats:p>