Abstract
<title>Abstract</title> <p>Mass tort disputes, characterized by their severe destructiveness and extensive victim populations, pose formidable challenges to modern social governance and traditional remedial frameworks. As conventional dispute resolution mechanisms succumb to prolonged delays, prohibitive costs, and collective action problems, bankruptcy reorganization has progressively transcended the boundaries of private law, emerging as an alternative paradigm for managing such public crises. However, the foundational ethos of bankruptcy reorganization—anchored in economic efficiency and corporate rescue—creates an inherent value mismatch with the public justice and victim relief functions enshrined in tort liability law. Drawing upon interdisciplinary theories and a comparative law perspective, this article critically examines the internal logic and due process crises associated with resolving mass torts through bankruptcy procedures. The research reveals profound global divergences in the application of these mechanisms: in stark contrast to the highly controversial ‘Texas Two-Step’ and non-consensual third-party releases in the United States, other major jurisdictions exercise pronounced institutional restraint. Within this global context, China’s mass tort bankruptcy practice confronts a myriad of localized dilemmas, including rigid reorganization thresholds, latent risks of bankruptcy fraud, and the absence of due process safeguards. To achieve a viable equilibrium between corporate rehabilitation and social justice, this article argues that China must pursue a nuanced institutional reconstruction. Rather than proposing localized legislative amendments, this article abstracts three fundamental institutional prerequisites: a systematic ex-ante value identification interface, an independent representation mechanism for future claimants, and the re-calibration of intergenerational priority rules. This theoretical framework provides a universal evaluative matrix for modern risk societies, fundamentally bridging the structural divide between commercial efficiency and distributive justice in global mass tort governance.</p>