From Understanding to Testimony: Reconstructing the Philosophy of Testimony through Hermeneutics

<title>Abstract</title> <p>Contemporary discussions in the philosophy of testimony have predominantly concentrated on the epistemological domain, focusing on the conditions of epistemic justification and the mechanisms of knowledge transmission, thereby obscuring the more fundamental hermeneutical premises underlying the acceptance of the discourse of others. However, investigations into the issue of testimony should shift their central focus from the question of “how knowledge is possible” to “how understanding is possible,” thereby revealing its inherent intersubjectivity. By introducing Heidegger’s structure of Mitsein (Being-with) and Gadamer's dialogical theory grounded in historicity and tradition, it becomes evident that the reception of testimony is fundamentally predicated upon a primordial trust and an openness toward the speech of the other. Building upon this foundation, Jean Nabert’s philosophy of reflection regarding “original affirmation” and Paul Ricoeur’s concept of “attestation” further illuminate the ethical dimensions of testimony. Testimony is not merely a medium for transmitting objective facts; rather, it constitutes an ethical commitment characterized by reciprocal responsiveness and the assumption of responsibility among subjects. This is particularly salient in the context of modern historical traumas, where testimony bears the profound mission of speaking on behalf of the voiceless absent and resisting oblivion. Consequently, testimony transcends its role as a mere epistemic medium, emerging as a hermeneutical practice deeply rooted in understanding, Mitsein, and the ethics of alterity.</p>