Abstract
<jats:p><p><strong>Context and relevance. </strong>Recent diagnostic shifts in defining autism, especially in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, have increased sensitivity but blurred boundaries between autism as a neurobiological condition and as a socially constructed identity. This ambiguity raises questions about how diagnosis shapes social labeling, access to support, and the framing of cognitive differences. <strong>Objective. </strong>This study aims to interrogate dominant deficit-based definitions of autism and to explore alternative historical and sociocultural frameworks that highlight cognitive strengths and non-pathological forms of alterity. <strong>Hypothesis. </strong>Current diagnostic models insufficiently capture the complexity of autism and reinforce reductive, medicalized paradigms. Re-examining neglected prototypes and sociocultural insights may help construct more inclusive and strength-based conceptions. <strong>Methods and Materials. </strong>This theoretical, interdisciplinary analysis draws from psychiatric classification systems, early clinical texts, contemporary autism studies, and phenomenological observations in educational contexts. It adopts constructivist epistemology, critical realism, and epistemological pluralism to question the ideo- logical underpinnings of diagnostic norms. <strong>Results. </strong>The analysis reveals a conceptual divide between &ldquo;neurobiological autism&rdquo; and &ldquo;social autism.&rdquo; It also identifies the diagnostic consequences of erasing early models such as Grunya Sukhareva&rsquo;s, which offer explanations for gender differences and cognitive diversity often missed by current frame- works. <strong>Conclusions. </strong>Dominant classifications pathologize difference and neglect cognitive strengths. Rethinking the boundary between diagnosis, cognition, and social recognition can foster anti-discriminatory practices in education and healthcare policies.</p></jats:p>