Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This chapter examines a more fundamental form of disagreement than perspectival disagreement: disagreement about personhood itself. When some members of society reject the conception of personhood underlying the Public Reason Model, this creates “deep moral pluralism,” where traditional moral theories cannot resolve conflicts. Drawing on multilevel social contract theory, the chapter explores how societies might establish a “minimal morality” based purely on instrumental rationality and prudential values when public justification fails. However, the chapter argues that even this Hobbesian minimal morality cannot fully escape the requirements of public reason. Three key points emerge: (1) the baseline for Hobbesian bargaining requires public justification to have normative force; (2) individuals need public reasons to set aside their moral commitments; and (3) political institutions enforcing minimal morality need legitimacy grounded in public principles. Thus, while deep pluralism limits public reason’s scope, it cannot eliminate it entirely—some minimal shared conception of personhood remains necessary.</jats:p>