Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This chapter examines hinge-based accounts of delusions, often framed as “background theories.” These accounts address three interrelated issues: the status of delusions (whether they qualify as beliefs), their rationality (whether they are rational responses to unusual experiences or irrational attitudes producing such experiences), and their intelligibility. The chapter first reviews the main claims of existing hinge accounts, assessing their explanatory strengths and limitations without assuming the specific hinge epistemology developed in this volume. Subsequently, it introduces a novel hinge-epistemological framework for understanding delusions. Finally, by incorporating the distinction between de facto and de jure hinges, the account avoids collapsing into epistemic relativism, explaining why delusions can be both intelligible and subject to correction, rather than merely accepted as rational alternatives grounded in different hinges.</jats:p>