Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This chapter examines ameliorative approaches to the concept “woman,” evaluating both Sally Haslanger’s Carnapian-inspired top-down proposal and a Wittgensteinian bottom-up alternative. Haslanger’s approach is critiqued for its limited ability to account for conceptual continuity through change and its prescriptive, top-down methodology. The Wittgensteinian alternative reconceives “woman” as a family-resemblance concept, emphasizing continuity grounded in evolving social practices and inclusive of transwomen. This approach is argued to be descriptively more accurate and politically preferable, aligning conceptual change with lived realities. The chapter further explores the externalist implications of this framework, highlighting its capacity to mediate the interaction between concepts and stereotypes. Drawing on the revised notion of hermeneutical injustice, it is shown that the proposed account reduces the risk of perpetuating epistemic harm against self-identifying women. Finally, the chapter situates the account within the broader context of hinge epistemology, conceptual change, and the interplay between philosophical quietism, activism, and imaginative practice.</jats:p>