Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This chapter examines hermeneutical injustice, the second form of epistemic injustice identified by Miranda Fricker, through the historical and conceptual lens of hysteria. It argues that the diagnostic concept of hysteria was maintained by power structures shaped by negative prejudice against women, exemplifying Fricker’s criteria for hermeneutical injustice. Building on this case, the chapter engages in conceptual engineering to refine the notion of hermeneutical injustice, making it a more robust tool for addressing biased and harmful concepts. Applying this framework, it is shown that while “hysteria” is no longer clinically employed, its colloquial use continues to encode identity prejudice, constituting a persistent form of epistemic and hermeneutical injustice. The chapter advocates abandoning such pernicious uses, allowing only for contexts of reclamation or reappropriation. This refined understanding of hermeneutical injustice is foundational for the subsequent discussion in Chapter 9, where it underpins arguments for the amelioration of gendered concepts such as “woman.”</jats:p>