Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This chapter develops a hinge-based account of testimonial justification, offering a novel alternative to the standard reductionist and anti-reductionist debate. Initially, it recasts this debate in analogy with the discussion between liberal and conservative accounts of perceptual justification, highlighting the limitations of both approaches. Building on Coliva’s moderate account of perceptual justification and constitutivist epistemic rationality, the chapter proposes a moderate, constitutivist framework for testimonial justification. Central to this account is the notion of a local de jure hinge—specifically, that “T is a trustworthy informant with respect to p”—which serves as the constitutive hinge underpinning testimonial justification. The chapter further examines potential objections and clarifies the scope and implications of this approach, demonstrating how hinge epistemology can reconcile the strengths of both reductionist and anti-reductionist perspectives while maintaining a principled account of social epistemic rationality.</jats:p>