Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This chapter examines John Greco’s recent attempt to provide a unitary characterization of hinges and assesses its strengths and limitations. Greco’s account highlights how hinges can be easily acquired, circulate freely within the knowledge economy, and often function as instances of procedural or tacit knowledge. By situating hinges as a form of common knowledge—neither generated nor transmitted—Greco sheds light on their role in cognitive practices. Yet his framework also overlooks crucial distinctions, particularly between de jure and de facto hinges, and among de facto hinges, empirical ones in particular. The chapter argues that Greco’s proposal, while instructive, fails to capture Wittgenstein’s central insight that some hinges, especially de jure ones, cannot be objects of evidential justification or knowledge. Instead, Greco’s model aligns more closely with G. E. Moore’s treatment of commonsense truisms, raising important contrasts with Wittgensteinian hinge epistemology.</jats:p>