Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This chapter looks at epistemic-moral dilemmas. Recently, a number of philosophers have argued that, in some circumstances, prejudicial beliefs are both morally wrong and rationally required. In order to avoid this conflict, some have argued that belief is morally encroached upon—that is, the standards of epistemic rationality can shift in light of moral considerations. In assessing the moral encroachment thesis, Ross distinguishes between ‘definitive prejudice’ and ‘probabilistic prejudice’. He argues that if the ordinary norms of epistemic rationality that apply to morally neutral beliefs also applied to prejudicial beliefs, then while definitive prejudice would never be rationally required, probabilistic prejudice would be. Hence, he argues, if we are to maintain that probabilistic prejudice is never rationally required, we must accept the moral encroachment thesis. In fact, we must accept a radical version of the thesis affecting the most fundamental rational norms.</jats:p>