Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This chapter focuses on the No-Paradise Dilemma. According to the dilemma, one ought and ought not to believe a specific proposition. The dilemma results from some initially plausible epistemic ideals concerning rationality, logic, and self-knowledge, coupled with our evidence about our cognitive failures. Our evidence indicates that we are not in an epistemic paradise, in which we do not experience cognitive failures. The chapter opts for a resolution of the dilemma that is based on an evidentialist position that can be motivated independently of the dilemma. According to this position, it is rational for an agent to believe a proposition on the agent’s total evidence just in case the (total) evidence stably supports the proposition. Based on this evidentialist position, the chapter argues for the initially implausible claim that it is not an epistemic ideal in the actual world that we hold rational beliefs that are logically equivalent to our rational beliefs. The dilemma is resolved by giving up this ideal for the actual world and adopting the evidentialist position in terms of stable evidential support.</jats:p>