Abstract
<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This chapter discusses the characterization and significance of a priori justification in relation to the contrast between conceptions of apriority as primarily a property of propositions and views that see apriority as primarily a property of episodes of belief-formation. First, it argues that the exclusive adoption of either of the two frameworks is problematic. The exclusive focus on propositions risks detaching a priori justification from the cognitive lives of actual subjects, while a narrow preoccupation with belief-formation neglects the importance of the epistemic architecture of one’s beliefs. Second, it is suggested that to avoid these opposite mistakes, a theory of the a priori must engage with both the dimensions of propositional and doxastic justification. Finally, the chapter explores the possibility that the significance of the a priori may be disclosed by immunity from brute errors in Burge’s sense—errors that are not due to the subject’s rational failure or cognitive malfunction.</jats:p>